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                Date: 1999-09-01
                 
                 
                US: Handys werden Ortungsgeraete fuer FBI
                
                 
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      GSM Provider müßen ihre Netzwerke so modifizieren, dass  
aus Handys Ortungsgeräte werden, dazu will das FBI noch  
permanenten Zugang in die Netze -  CALEA [US] grüßt  
ENFOPOL [EU] . Die Civil Libertarians laufen Sturm gegen  
die Bewilligung der Federal Communications Commission.  
 
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(1) FCC MANDATES NEW TELEPHONE SURVEILLANCE  
FEATURES 
 
On Friday, August 27, the Federal Communications  
Commission (FCC) ordered the nation's telephone companies  
to modify their switching equipment to provide more  
information to government agencies conducting electronic  
surveillance.  The Commission largely rejected privacy  
concerns and aligned with the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation, which had sought the enhanced monitoring  
capabilities under the 1994 Communications Assistance for  
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 
 
The decision was the latest step in a long-running struggle  
over the surveillance potential of communications technology.  
CALEA was enacted in 1994 after the FBI complained to  
Congress that new digital technology and other advanced  
services would soon make it impossible to carry out wiretaps  
and other electronic surveillance.  The FBI originally sought  
direct control over phone system design.  Congress refused  
to grant the Bureau that kind of power, but adopted CALEA  
with the intent of balancing law enforcement, privacy and  
industry interests.  Congress made it clear that CALEA was  
intended to preserve but not enhance government monitoring  
capabilities.  The Act left design decisions to the telephone  
industry, subject to FCC review. 
 
However, soon after CALEA was enacted, the FBI began  
insisting on very specific surveillance features, including  
some never before available to the government. After industry  
worked with law enforcement agencies to draft technical  
standards to put CALEA into effect, the FBI claimed the  
industry plans did not go far enough and petitioned the FCC  
to order additional, specific surveillance features.  CDT  
claimed that the industry plan failed to protect privacy and  
opposed the FBI's add-ons.  
___________________________________________________ 
______________ 
 
(2) TURNING CELL PHONES INTO TRACKING DEVICES;  
OTHER FEATURES 
 
The most immediately disturbing element of the FCC's ruling  
was its requirement that cellular and other wireless phone  
companies provide the capability to identify where their  
customers are at the beginning and end of every call,  
effectively turning wireless phones into tracking devices. In  
1994, FBI Director Louis Freeh testified twice before  
Congress that CALEA did not cover this kind of location  
information.  While many cellular systems already have  
some ability to locate callers, CDT argued to the FCC that  
this should not be a mandatory element of system design.   
CDT was concerned that, as the technology evolves, the FBI  
is likely to seek more and more precise location information.   
The FCC ignored the legislative history and rejected CDT's  
concerns 
 
In addition, for both wireline and wireless systems, the FCC  
ruled that six other specific surveillance features sought by  
the FBI were required by CALEA. One of the six requires  
carriers to ensure that the government will be able to  
continue listening to those on a conference call after the  
criminal suspect has dropped off the call. Another add-on  
guarantees the government access to credit card numbers  
and bank account data generated when a user punches  
numbers on a telephone. Other add-ons ensure government  
access to the detailed signaling information generated in  
connection with calls, information that law enforcement would  
obtain under a legal standard lower than the one required to  
conduct a wiretap. CDT and the telephone industry had  
argued that none of these items was required by CALEA. 
 
Carriers are currently required to comply with most aspects  
of CALEA, including the location mandate, by June 30, 2000.  
 The other features required by the FCC last week must be  
available to the government by September 30, 2001. 
 
___________________________________________________ 
______________ 
 
(3) PACKET SWITCHING - CALEA'S SLEEPER ISSUE 
 
One CALEA issue of immense importance has received little  
press attention: how to conduct electronic surveillance in  
packet environments.  Packet technology, until recently used  
mainly on the Internet, breaks communication into many  
small packets, each consisting of some addressing  
information and some content.  For efficiency's sake, the  
packets may be transported by various routes, and are  
reassembled at their intended destination to create a  
coherent communication.  Packet technology is becoming  
increasingly important for voice communications, posing the  
risk that the government will obtain access to the content  
portion of packets when it has only sati 
sfied the lower legal standard for intercepting the call routing or addressing information. 
 
CDT argued that CALEA imposes on carriers an affirmative  
obligation to design their equipment, to the extent technically  
reasonable, to withhold content from the government when  
the government has not met the legal standard to intercept it.  
 Industry responded that carriers should be allowed to  
disclose everything to law enforcement, including content,  
and rely on the government not to read (or listen to) what it is  
has no authority to intercept. 
 
The FCC declined to require carriers to protect the privacy of  
packet communications that the government is not  
authorized to intercept. Instead, the FCC requested the  
industry to report on what steps can be taken to protect the  
privacy of packet communications.  Last Fall, the  
Commission asked the same question and industry said that  
protecting privacy was too hard.  This leaves it to CDT to  
prove to the industry that the technology can be designed to  
protect privacy. 
 
Mehr 
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_5.21.html  
 
relayed by Ari Schwartz ari@cdt.org 
-.-  -.-. --.-   
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edited by  
published on: 1999-09-01 
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